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Abstract
We question the received wisdom on the role of corruption in economic devel-
opment and economic reform. We do so by treating corruption as a by-product
of bureaucratic institutions. We distinguish the roles played by corruption pre-
reform and during reform. We show that a one-time corruption is a catalyst for
reform by providing incentives for the bureaucrats in power to accede to reform
and to dissolve the class of bureaucrats. Thus, a one-time surge of corruption
can be a prelude to a permanently reduced level of corruption in the future.
JEL Classification Code: P21, P00, 010.
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ments. All errors are ours.
In this paper, we question the received wisdom on the role of corruption in a
reforming economy. We define corruption broadly as a situation where government
bureaucrats obtain personal benefits in exchange for the exercise of their power
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Corruption is generally regarded as an obstacle to economic development and a major
cause of the inefficiency of command economies. But as we note below, countries
reforming their economies to encourage a greater degree of capitalism often experience
a surge in the level of corruption. This is widely interpreted as a signal that reform is
being blocked or distorted by the power of entrenched bureaucrats. We argue that this
analysis may be flawed. Instead, a one-time rise in corruption is an essential catalyst
to reform, which in turn permanently eliminates or reduces the level of corruption and
the power of the bureaucrats. Thus, a normative implication of our analyses is that
corruption can be desirable if it is accompanied by a market-oriented institutional
change, such as the post-socialist transition.
Our argument is simple. Corruption results from the power that bureaucrats en-
joy. Bureaucratic power, in turn, is a product of bureaucratic institutions, in which
generations of bureaucrats succeed one another. The aim of reform is to eliminate
such institutions and to break the chain of succession of bureaucrats in order to let
the market mechanism prevail. Thus, by definition, reform is not Pareto improving.
Faced with a reform, bureaucrats will fight in various ways to block or delay insti-
tutional change, unless they can benefit personally from such change. The role of a
one-time surge in corruption is to overcome the opposition of bureaucrats to their
loss of power. In effect, this pits generations of bureaucrats against one another.
Bureaucrats who are currently in power are thus given an incentive to encourage re-
form and rein in their would-be successors, who oppose the change because it will
2
0ur definition of corruption is more inclusive than the traditional ones which imply that corrup-
tion is bureaucrats' spontaneous actions amounting to breaching public trust and therefore is illicit.
Here, we are not concerned with legal and moral isssues of corruption.
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curtail or eliminate the perquisites of the office they expect to hold. Once the reform
is successful and bureaucratic institutions are eliminated, corruption is permanently
reduced and ceases to be an obstacle to development.
Our analysis of the role of corruption in reform is rooted in observations of large-
scale social changes in many countries, including formerly socialist countries such as
China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. In general, Huntington (1968)
observes that political modernization, such as a transition from an autocratic to a
more democratic government, is usually accompanied by increases in corruption. In
reforming or transitional economies, corruption is widespread and takes on a great
variety of forms, ranging from directly taking money, to obtaining free shares in a
privatized firm, to taking important positions in newly formed business ventures.
In the next section, we shall present case studies of rampant corruption in several
transitional countries.
Our analysis is directly related to the current process of reform in these countries.
Our message is that one cannot make a blanket statement about corruption. Corrup-
tion must be judged with an eye to its role in promoting desirable institutional change.
"Good corruption" induces institutional change and should be allowed to flourish so
that reform can be successful. Of course, excessive levels of corruption may cause
social dissatisfaction and result in severe political repercussions. Thus, even reform-
inducing corruption should be controlled within moderate levels and executed in a
politically safe way.
Contrary to our view, the received wisdom on corruption is generally negative.
The reason is that previous analyses have focused on steady-state and permanent
corruption. By contrast, we study the implications of one-time corruption that is
connected to institutional change, and show that it can be beneficial even in a setting
where steady-state corruption is harmful.
Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983), United Nations (1989), and Klitgaard (1991) rep-
resent the dominant view that corruption impedes economic development./footnote
Huntington (1968) represents a minority position, that corruption is a by-product
of modernization. We, by contrast, argue that corruption is more closely related to
institutional change. Leff (1964) also dissents from the majority position and argues
that moderate corruption can improve efficiency. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) best ar-
ticulate this position in their systematic and sophisticated analysis of the organization
of corruption. They argue that even well-organized corruption is more distortionary
than taxation, while disorganized corruption can virtually eliminate economic devel-
opment.
Based on these analyses of the steady state, many have transferred their opposition
of corruption to the context of reform. Many Chinese experts list corruption as a
potential pitfall of the Chinese economic reform. In the Russian context, Shleifer
(1994) argues that corruption can be dangerous since it is self-generating due to the
hunger of bureaucrats for ever more power. Other observers of economic reform are
puzzled by the paradoxical combination of improvement in economic efficiency and
increases in corruption (The Economist, 1994).
In order to examine the relationship between corruption and institutional change,
we utilize a framework in which corruption arises naturally as a by-product of eco-
nomic institutions. Before reform, the economy is in a "bureaucratic steady state"
in which power is transferred between generations of bureaucrats and corruption is
endemic. Reform or institutional change aims to end this bureaucratic steady state.
But paradoxically, ending corruption in the long run may require that we increase it
in the short run, in order to persuade current bureaucrats to surrender their power.
Thus, contrary to the previous literature, which assumes that the economy is in the
bureaucratic steady state, our analysis implies that corruption per se is not necessarily
an obstacle to reform. Our analysis is positive, but it carries the normative impli-
cation that reform should be designed to tolerate - and even encourage - moderate
levels of corruption.
In the next section, we present two case studies of corruption during reform and
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argue that the evidence is consistent with our interpretation that bureaucrats need
to be bribed in order to accede to reform. Then in section 3, we model corruption,
both in a steady state where bureaucrats have power and during the process of a
reform designed to eliminate that power. The analysis based on the model forms the
core of the paper's argument. In section 4, we extend the basic model along several
dimensions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Case Studies of Corruption and Reform
We study two cases of corruption in the reform process in two countries that are
reforming in very different ways, Russia and China.
A. The Russian Privatization
The extremely successful Russian privatization is a good illustration of our theory
of the role of corruption. Unlike privatization in many other transitional economies,
the Russian privatization takes a very rapid pace. In less than a year and a half since
the inception of the program, over 20% of the industrial labor has been employed by
the new private sector.3
We would argue that the pace and success of the Russian privatization program
are directly due to its proper design, which includes large-scale and systematic bribery
of the incumbent bureaucrats in order to enlist their support for reform. In Russia,
as in our model, the bureaucrats - especially managers - are potential losers of priva-
tization. In the pre-privatization system, they enjoy enormous control rights. After
privatization, not only are their control rights constrainted and contested by share-
holders, their very position is often jeopardized due to takeover threats. However,
given that they possess important information on the current operation of the firm,
privatization cannot be implemented effectively without their cooperation (Shaffer
3See Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
and Fan, 1994). To win the support of the management class, the Russian program
offers large shares in the new enterprises, which are essentially bribes to the existing
management (see Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Not only does this mollify their
resistance to re form, it actively enlists their aid since the value of the bribe increases
with the success of reform.
As our theory predicts, in the Russian privatization, the incumbent bureaucrats,
or the managers of the formerly state-owned enterprises, benefit the most from the
privatization procedure. The young or future bureaucrats get no special deal. Taking
advantage of their superior position in the firm, the managers actually have obtained
an average of 17% of the shares of the enterprises. Indeed, as Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) concluded, "the Russian managers are emerging from privatization wi th often
quite substantial ownership of cash flows."
4
The fast-paced Russian privatization program also successfully avoids the com-
mitment problem. Once the incumbent bureaucrats (the managers) become large
shareholders of their firm, they have strong incentives to fight against any potential
restoration of the old system, which the younger generation of bureaucrats may pre-
fer. Thus, as our model predicts, a properly-designed reform process pits groups of
bureaucrats against one another, buying their support and vitiating their resistance.
B. The Dual Track Pricing System in the Chinese Economic Reform
The Chinese economic reform, which appears to be drastically different from the
Russian one, is in essence no different from the perspective of our theory. For the
purpose of illustration, take for example the most peculiar early step of the Chinese
economic reform, the dual-track pricing system. We argue that the design of the dual
track pricing system provides incumbent bureaucrats with large amount one-time
economic rents (bribes from corruption) in exchange for surrendering their rights to
'Page 35.
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set price and allocate productive materials in the future.
The dual-track system worked as its name suggests. Under the system, the plan-
ning agency negotiated a contract with each of the firms under its control. According
to the contract, each firm was to deliver a certain amount of output (the output
quota) at the planned price, and at the same time was entitled to a certain amount of
input (the input quota) at the planned price. Beyond the quota, firms could buy and
sell in the free market. The dual-track system formally came into being at the begin-
ning of 1985 (see Diao, 1987). The price difference between the "tracks" reached the
highest point in 1988, chiefly due to inflationary pressure. By 1992, the two "tracks"
had been merged to the "market track" for all but a few basic inputs.
The dual-track pricing system simultaneously served two purposes. On one hand,
it provided a convenient means for the incumbent bureaucrats to extract greater
rents from their vested power. On the other hand, with the ultimate goal of greatly
reducing central planning and price control, the dual-track system gradually phased
out the institutions of economic planning. This juxtaposition was not coincidental:
the first was a prerequisite for bureaucrats to acquiesce to the second.
In the dual-track system, the price difference between the two tracks provided
enormous opportunities for bureaucrats to arbitrage for profit. Thus, their control
rights were simply translated into economic rents. In fact, around 1987, on average
about 50% of the firm's profit consisted of economic rents associated with quotas (Li,
1994). However, with the introduction of the market track, the control domain of the
planning bureaucrats was reduced. Given the general trend of moving towards the
market mechanism, the dual-track system essentially presented the last opportunity
for the bureaucrats in the planning agencies to benefit from their control rights.
This is why an outright price liberalization - which cannot leave any benefits for
the bureaucr ats - was rejected in China as a reform strategy around 1984. At the
same time, privatizing the firms by giving bureaucrats shares was utterly impossible
in China due to political and ideological reasons.
The evolution of the Chinese reform illustrates an important lesson that emerges
from our model. The lesson is that top leaders must be committed to reform for it to
be carried out. Without such commitment, corruption by itself will not be enough to
ev entually phase out bureaucratic power over the economy, both because of opposi-
tions from the bureaucrats who have not benefited from the corruption scheme and
due to popular discontent with excessive corruption. In 1989, corruption associated
with the du al track system had gone out of control, forming the economic basis for
the political turmoil in Tienanmen Square. After Tienanmen Square, conservative
factions tried to reverse the course of reform. Eventually, in 1992, Deng Xiaoping
himself had to intervene before price reform could be concluded and other reforms
enacted.
3. The Model
We model the bureaucratic institution as a bureau that has the authority to issue
business licenses. A license is necessary in order to establish or operate any business.
There is no economic justification for the existence of such a bureau. It exists for
an ideological and political reason: the desire of the government and bureaucrats to
exert control over private business. Reform consists of abolishing the licensing bureau
and setting entrepreneurs free to start and operate their privAte business.
A. Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats
We concentrate on two classes of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs (E) and
bureaucrats (B). Both live for two periods and neither internalizes the utility of his
successors or descendants. For simplicity, we initially assume that there is always one
bureaucrat for each entrepreneur. The utility (payoff) for both entrepreneurs and
bureaucrats is the undiscounted sum of their first and second period incomes.
The model focuses on the life cycle of a representative entrepreneur (E) and the two
relevant generations of bureaucrats (B's). There are two periods with two negotiating
moments. At time 0, the entrepreneur has to obtain a production license from the
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licensing office in order to establish a private business. With the production license
approved, she decides how much to invest in a production process. At time 1 she has
to renew her production license from the new bureaucrat who has assumed control of
the office.
Let the investment by the entrepreneur at time 0 be k, which is irreversible and





Two generations of bureaucrats work in the licensing bureau at the same time.
This is due to the hierarchical nature of the bureaucratic organization, as Kornai
(1992) and Williamson (1975) have argued. Young bureaucrats have little power
because they are in training for senior positions and because promotion is mainly
based on seniority. Importantly, only the old generation of bureaucrats has the power
to issues licenses. Corresponding to the two production periods of the entrepreneur,
two consecutive generations of bureaucrats are in power. At time 0, the old generation
of bureaucrat (represented by B1) is in charge while the young generation (represented
by B2) works in the same office but does not have any decision rights. At time 1, the
old generation retires and the young generation takes control.
When issuing the production license, the bureaucrat in power takes a bribe from
the entrepreneur. The size of the bribe is determined by bargaining between the
bureaucrat and the entrepreneur. We model the outcome by a simple Nash bargaining
game and assume that the entrepreneur's bargaining power is a.
B. Commitment of The Top Leadership and their Cooperation with the
Bureaucrat
In all reforms, a change in the top leadership is always the first move and the
top leader's (T) commitment to reform is a critical condition for the reform to be
successful. In the Russian or Eastern European case, the transition is headed by a
reforming government which was popularly elected after a political revolution. Com-
mitment to reform is the basis of the political platform which enables the government
to be elected. In the Chinese case, the reform started in 1978 with a change in the
top leadership when Deng Xiaoping took over the national power from Hua Guofeng,
Mao Zetong's hand-picked and conservative successor.
To catch the importance of the top leadership's commitment, our model makes two
assumptions about the top leader (T). First, before the reform, T is fully committed to
the cause of the maintaining of the bureaucratic institution. Specifically in our model,
T guards against any tendency of the bureaucrat's effort in closing the licensing office
and committed to re-open it if it does happen. In this case, despite that the old
(incumbent) bureaucrat B1 knows that he can strike a deal with the entrepreneur E
by grabbing a large bribe and closing the office, the new bureaucrat B2 will report
and resort to the power of the top to reopen the office. In reality, this corresponds to
Mao's idea of constant revolution to fight against the potential of the coming back of
the capitalism.
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The second assumption of the top is that during the reform, they are fully com-
mitted to the cause of changing the bureaucratic institution. As an extreme and
simplifying assumption, this implies in the model that once the licensing office is
closed, even though the young bureaucrat (B2) has interests in reopening it, the en-
trepreneur will inform and resort to the top leader T to keep such attempts of B2
futile.
Implicit in these two assumptions is another one that the cooperation between
t
Mao's fundamental thought in this regard can be summarized by his famous quotation:"Socialism
is a long historical period, during which there exist classes, class conflicts, and class struggle and
persistently there are dangers of the restoration of capitalism, .... Therefore, we always have to
pay attention to class struggle every year, every month, and every day." - Selected Works of Mao
Zetong, People's Press, Beijing, China.
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the top and the bureaucrat under him is crucial in fulfilling his commitment. That
is, before reform, the top needs the cooperation of the young bureaucrat (e.g. to
inform the top) to guard against the attempts of closing the office." During the
reform, the top needs the cooperation of the old bureaucrat in closing the office, since
a non-cooperative incumbent bureaucrat can easily increase the cost of the transition
by abusing his last-minute power. A typical example is decapitaliztation or making
"sweet deals with foreign investors" by incumbent managers as witnessed in many
transitional economies.
Therefore, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reform is the top leader's
commitment to reform. Such a commitment combined with a one-time surge in
corruption constitutes a sufficient condition for reform.
C. The Bureaucratic Steady State
In a bureaucratic steady state, the institution of the licensing office is maintained
over time. The simple game outlined above is repeated for many generations of
bureaucrats.
The bargaining outcome at time 1 determines the amount of bribery as a fee
for renewing the license. If the license is renewed, ir(k) will be the total income;
otherwise income is 0. With the Nash assumption, the young bureaucrat (B2) can
demand (1 - a)7r(k) for the license. In other words, the entrepreneur will get air(k)
as her share of the income. At time 0, when the license is first issued, both the
entrepreneur and the old bureaucrat (B1) anticipate the time 1 bargaining. If a
license is issued at time 0, the total income that can be shared by both B1 and E is:
7r(k) - k + a7r(k)
since (1 - a)ir(k) will be expropriated by B2. By the Nash bargaining rule, E gets
a[(2ir(k) - k) - (1 - a)ir(k)]. (3.1)
In this view, there is no coincidence that Mao always found that his best followers were the
young "Red Guards".
Therefore, E's optimal investment level is given by the first order condition:
(1 + a)ir'(k) = 1. (3.2)
Let k,, be the steady state investment level that satisfies the first order condition.
Our assumptions on 7r ensure that the second order conditions are satisfied and that
(1 + a)r(k,) - k, > 0
which guarantees that there will be a positive amount of investment in the steady
state.
On the other hand, the total social benefit of the investment is
27r(k) - k
which implies that the socially optimal level of k is such that
2ir'(k) = 1. (3.3)
Let k* be the socially efficient level of investment implied by this equation. Again,
the assumptions on 7r tell us that
27r(k*)-k*>0.
It is then easy to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In a bureaucratic steady state, the entrepreneur does not invest up to
the level of social efficiency. In other words, k., < k'.
We can interpret this result in a number of ways. From the perspective of property
rights, bureaucrats possess the right to stop production, and so can share in the
income from production. Generally, however, the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) tells
us that reassigning control rights does not impede efficiency. Indeed, this is true
of the control right of the old bureaucrat, who can negotiate with the entrepreneur
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before investment and production are determined. In our overlapping generations
framework, the source of the inefficiency is the inability of the young bureaucrat to
also participate in the negotiations before the project starts.
From a public finance perspective, the bribe paid to B1 is a pure profits tax, which
is not distortionary. The bribe demanded by B2, on the other hand, is like a sales
tax, which reduces investment.
From an institutional perspective, the source of the inefficiency is the old bu-
reaucrat's inability to commit his successor to "tax" only profits and not income.
Although we have discussed B1 and B2 as if they are distinct individuals (and we
believe the distinction is important for our analysis of reform), this analysis suggests
a reinterpretation in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986). That is, we can regard
B1 and B2 as the same individual at two different points in time, where the source
of the inefficiency is the bureaucrat's inability to precommit to a second period bribe
of given size. In this interpretation, our problem is closely related to the problem of
capital taxation in the time consistency literature (e.g. Fischer, 1980).
D. The Reform
With the advent of reform, there is pressure from the top leadership as well as from
the general public to close the licensing office permanently. However, the bureaucrat
in power can easily delay or block the process, since in reality his cooperation is
needed to implement reform. Thus, the reform program must provide incentives to
ensure that the office is closed. As usual, bureaucrats take bribes for their actions
and the bureaucrat in power is the beneficiary.
We formalize the notion that bureaucratic cooperation is necessary for reform
by giving bureaucrats in power the right to decide whether to close their offices
permanently. The key player in the reform is thus the old bureaucrat, who is in
power at time 0 and decides whether to close his office. The potential loser is the
young bureaucrat whose career ends prematurely if the office is closed, losing him
the income he had expected from bribes in the next period. Anticipating this, the
young bureaucrat will himself try to bribe the old bureaucrat not to close the office.
The maximum bribe is the potential license fee that the young bureaucrat can collect
should the office stay open, that is
W2 = (1 - a)x(k..).
On the other hand, the entrepreneur wishes to see the office closed immediately. As
our analysis of Proposition 1 shows, if the office is closed investment rises to the
socially efficient level k*. With the young bureaucrat gone, the total profit being
divided between the old bureaucrat and the entrepreneur is
27r(k*) - k*
which is also the most that the entrepreneur can offer to the old bureaucrat. Clearly,
27r(k") -k* > W2 =(1 -a)7r(k,,)
since
27r(k*) - k* - (1 - a)ir(k,,) = 2ir(k,,) - k,, - (1 - a)ir(k,,) = (1 + ca)ir(k,) - k,, > 0.
Intuitively, 27r(k*) - k* is the socially optimal level of profits, which is larger than
the pre-reform profit 2ir(k.,) - k,,, which in turn is larger than the bribe paid to the
young bureaucrat, W2.
The outcome of the political struggle is unambiguously a success for reform. That
is, the office is closed at time 0 and the young bureaucrat is sacrificed. In essence,
reform allows the entrepreneur and the old bureaucrat to cooperate, eliminate the
young bureaucrat as a claimant to the income, and divide the bigger post-reform
profit among fewer parties. The old bureaucrat's bargaining position is determined
by his income if he blocks reform: his usual one-period bribe, which he can get should
reform fail, plus W2, which the young bureaucrat offers for keeping the office open.
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Therefore, according to the Nash bargaining solution, the payoff to the old bureaucrat
is
(1 - a)[(2ir(k*) - k*) - (2nr(k,,) - k,,)]+ (1 - a)[ir(k,,) + asr(k,,) - k.,]+ (1 - a)ir(k,,)
= (1 - a)[(2ir(k*) - k*) - (2ir(k,,) - k,,)] + (1 - a)[2ir(k,,) + a7r(k,,) - k,,]
= (1 - a)[(2r(k*) - k*)+ air(k,,)). (3.4)
Therefore, the payoff to the entrepreneur becomes
(2ir(k*) - k*) - (1 - a)[(2ir(k*) - k*) + air(k,,)]
= a[(2ir(k*) - k*) - (1 - a)ir(k,,)]. (3.5)
The intuition behind (3.5) is that the entrepreneur must share with the old bu-
reaucrat the increase in the higher income due to higher investment. Notice the
symmetry between equations (3.5) and (3.1). Comparing (3.5) to (3.1), we see that
the entrepreneur is unambiguously better off: she receives some of the benefits from
the increase in production. The old bureaucrat is also better off, both for the same
reason (the pie is larger) and because he receives the bribe that would have gone to
the young bureaucrat in the next period if reform had not taken place (thus getting
a larger share of the pie). To summarize, then, we have:
Proposition 2 With the advent of reform, the licensing office will be closed perma-
nently by the old bureaucrat and the entrepreneur's investment is socially optimal.
Two implications of this outcome are worth discussing. The first is that reform
does not make everybody better off. The loser is the young generation of bureaucrats.
Thus reform is efficient only in a utilitarian sense. The second implication is that
the immediate effect of the reform is a surge in the level of corruption, from (1 -
a)[r(k,,) + air(k,,) - k,,] to (1 - a)[(2ir(k*) - k*) + air(k 8)]. So institutional change,
which amounts to the removal of barriers to investment, leads to higher than usual
levels of corruption. As we noted above, however, this high level of bribery is a signal
that reform is proceeding, not an indication that it is being blocked.
Corollary 1 During the reform process the level of bribery is higher than in the
bureaucratic steady state.
At this point we should warn against taking the idea of "bribes from the young
bureaucrats" too literally. While there may indeed be some of that, we also use the
idea as a metaphor for a host of issues. Bureaucrats who accede to reform must
surrender their power (which gives them the enjoyable private benefits of control
as argued by Hart, 1992), must act against the interests of their class, and must go
against the habits of a lifetime. The higher level of corruption is necessary to overcome
these inertial obstacles, as well as the active opposition of the next generation of
bureaucrats.
Interestingly, however, as we claimed in the introduction, the higher level of cor-
ruption is necessary to facilitate reform and is not itself a source of inefficiency. In the
steady state there is a one-to-one correspondence between the degree of corruption,
as given by bureaucrats' bargaining power, 1- a, and the degree of inefficiency (com-
pare equations 3.2 and 3.3. But reform succeeds in eliminating the licensing office,
and with it the next generation of bureaucrats who would have been the source of
the inefficiency. With reform, bribes are pure transfers from entrepreneurs to the last
generation of bureaucrats. As the Coase theorem shows, such transfers do not cause
inefficiency.
So far we have made a positive analysis of corruption during reform. However,
our analysis also suggests a prescription for designing institutional change. The lit-
erature on reform argues that a major problem is establishing property rights for
entrepreneurs free of bureaucratic controls (Shleifer, 1994), since bureaucrats natu-
rally resist this effort to eliminate their power and income. We suggest that it is
not necessary to immediately transfer all control rights to entrepreneurs, since some
current bureaucratic control does not necessarily lead to inefficiency. (Note, however,
that entrepreneurs have strong incentives to press for full control immediately and
to misrepresent the efficiency effects of bureaucratic control, since property rights
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retained by bureaucrats reduce entrepreneurs' incomes.) In fact, our analysis shows
that there is a natural conflict of interests between generations of bureaucrats, since
they essentially get pieces of the same pie. Reform can be designed in a way to exploit
this conflict and enlist some of the bureaucrats on the side of institutional change.
Thus, rather than turning all the entrenched interests against reform, the change can
be designed in such a way that bureaucrats dissipate their strength in fighting one
another. Although this may entail a temporary surge in corruption, which carries
political costs, our analysis shows that this strategy need not imply efficiency losses.
3. Further Discussions
A. Secrecy and Liquidity Constraints
Secrecy is a distinguishing feature of corruption. Corruption has to be secretive,
due to its illegal and politically sensitive nature. The parties involved thus need
to invest a lot of their energy in maintaining secrecy (or at least "plausible denia-
bility"). Therefore, as Shleifer and Vishny (1093) argue, in the bureaucratic steady
state secrecy makes corruption more distortionary than taxation. We agree with their
analysis of the pre-reform situation.
However, we argue that the opposite can be true in the context of reform: that is,
secrecy can actually facilitate reform. The reason is simple. We have argued that the
young bureaucrats and entrepreneurs engage in a bidding war to bribe the old bureau-
crats to reform. In our exposition above, we implicitly assumed that neither young
is liquidity constrained. Consequently, both can bribe up to their reservation values:
this assumption, plus the fact that reform is efficient, guarantees that entrepreneurs
can pay more and therefore reform takes place.
The conclusion is no longer as clear if there are liquidity constraints. The sim-
plest type of liquidity constraint is that the young may not borrow at all. Liquidity
constraints of this type imply that even if reform is unambiguously desirable it may
not take place: the young bureaucrats may outbid the young entrepreneurs if they
have more resources in the first period.
Now, however, suppose we introduce a loan market, and allow both the young to
borrow against their future income. Entrepreneurs have legitimate investments that
guarantee them second-period income. Therefore, they can obtain a loan against
their expected future income pending the closing of the office, which is a publicly
observed event. However, young bureaucrats cannot borrow against future income
from corruption, which takes place secretly. Then it is clear that secrecy facilitates
reform. This differential access to the loan market gives entrepreneurs an edge in
bribing the old bureaucrats into reforming in the first period. Also, it means that
the old bureaucrats' bargaining position is weakened when dealing with the young
entrepreneurs - since the young bureaucrats may not be able to bribe up to their
reservation values, the old bureaucrats cannot credibly extort as much in bribes as
they could before. Therefore, the combination of these two considerations implies
that in a world with liquidity constraints, secrecy actually favors reform.
Hence the fact that corruption takes place in secret, which is distortionary in
the pre-reform bureaucratic steady state, is actually a help to reform. Of course,
there may be institutions that allow bureaucrats to borrow some against part of their
expected future bribes.7 But the extreme assumption illustrates the basic thrust of
this section: the fact that income from corruption is secret means that bureaucrats
are more liquidity constrained before they receive this income than are those whose
'The Indian marriage market provides one mechanism: the dowry paid to the groom increases
dramatically if he is able to enter the bureaucracy. Anxious fathers of prospective brides reportedly
bribe examiners for the results of the Indian Administrative Service exams before they are made
public, so a future IAS officer may first learn of his good fortune when his prospective father-in-law




Corruption can be either centralized or decentralized. In general, as Shleifer and
Vishny (1993) have argued, decentralized corruption is the more distortionary of the
two. The reason is simple. With decentralized corruption, the approval of a number
of bureaucrats is needed to undertake a project, and each bureaucrat may attempt
to extract more than his share of the surplus from the project. In such a situation,
of course, the project cannot be executed.
In the context of reform, it is not immediately clear that decentralized corruption
presents the greater problem. Suppose there are N bureaucrats who need to be
bribed to close their offices in the first period in order to induce the socially efficient
level of investment k*. Then there is clearly a bargaining issue over how the N
bureaucrats are to divide their "extra" bribe (the amount that the entrepreneur will
pay above the customary bribe to each bureaucrat). Formalize the bargaining as
follows: suppose each of the N bureaucrats simultaneously claims a share, s., of
the surplus. If Ee s~ > 1, there is no surplus to divide, and they each get zero
(extra bribes). In a Nash equilibrium, this situation cannot arise. All Nash equilibria
have the property that the project is executed, and any distribution of s~ such that
E, s,, < 1 can be an equilibrium.8
But the intuition that many bureaucrats may fail to coordinate is an appealing
one, and further analysis reveals that decentralized corruption can indeed be more
difficult for reform. For analyzing an unprecedented situation like major institutional
change, the solution concept of Nash equilibrium that we have hitherto used may
itself be problematic. The distinguishing feature of Nash equilibrium is that the
equilibrium actions of all players are common knowledge. That is, each player plays
50f course, an important assumption here is perfect information. Once some of the bureaucrats
are unsure of the size of the potential surplus, then they may ask for too large a bribe in the
aggregate, causing the project to be delayed or even cancelled.
a best response to the known actions of all the other players. Thus, Nash equilibrium
presupposes a high degree of strategic certainty. This assumption is justified by
an appeal to stability - if a game were played many times, the only strategies
that players would use over and over are the Nash equilibrium strategies. So Nash
equilibrium is likely to be a reasonable solution concept to analyze a situation that
has been observed many times and where agents have had a chance to learn each
other's strategies - for example, the bureaucratic steady state.
We believe, however, that an unprecedented situation like economic reform is char-
acterized by a high degree of strategic uncertainty, which makes Nash equilibrium an
unsuitable solution concept for analyzing some aspects of bargaining during reform.
One way to formalize the idea of strategic uncertainty is to use the concept of ra-
tionalizability (in the sense of Pearce, 1984). Rationalizability allows players to be
uncertain about the actions of their competitors - rather than knowing the strate-
gies used by their opponents, players only know that others will play "rationalizable"
strategies, which are best responses to strategies that they in turn could rationally
expect others to play. In the case of an one-shot, unprecedented situation like major
institutional reform, rationalizability allows us to formalize the notion of strategic
uncertainty. Thus, for this application, rationalizability may be a more appropriate
solution concept than Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that there are rationalizable
equilibria where we can indeed have situations where the average bureaucrat claims
more than his share of the bribe.9
Overall, the conclusion here is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1993) that is,
"decentralized bureaucracy" - in the sense of needing to satisfy many bureaucrats
at a point in time - is an obstacle to reform.
However, this is not the only possible interpretation of what it means to have a
1n a two-player game, one player could reasonably ask for half the bribe, assuming that the two
were going to split it 50-50. But the other player might claim two thirds, on the assumption that
they were going to split two thirds-one third. The two together ask for more than all of the bribe.
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decentralized bureaucracy. We return to this issue at the end of this section.
C. The Free Rider Problem Among Entrepreneurs
In dealing with decentralized corruption, we investigated a situation where there
was more than one bureaucrat per entrepreneur. Here we examine the opposite
case, where there is more than one entrepreneur per bureaucrat. Not surprisingly,
the analytics of the situation are quite similar. Here there is a potential free rider
problem among the entrepreneurs - entrepreneurs rely on each other to bribe the
bureaucrats.
Suppose there are N entrepreneurs who need to bribe a single "old" bureaucrat into
closing his office. As in our model above, they collectively have pay the bureaucrat an
extra bribe to induce him to accede to reform. Clearly this situation is one where all
of the entrepreneurs will want to see reform in place, but each wants to pay as little
of the extra bribe as possible. Again, assume a bargaining situation, now between the
entrepreneurs, like the one we discussed above. Therefore we have the same results:
there is no Nash equilibrium where the bribe is not paid and reform does not take
place, but there are many such rationalizable equilibria. Again, we conclude that the
intuition is correct: in a situation where many entrepreneurs benefit from closing a
single licensing office, it is more likely that the office will not be closed because of the
free rider problem.
However, we would naturally expect the free rider problem among entrepreneurs
to be much more severe than the "decentralized bureaucracy" problem of the previous
section. The reason is that the identities of the bureaucrats are known, to the public
and to each other. After all, they have been part of the old government agencies for
many years. Furthermore, bureaucrats are likely to be a relatively small group, with
mechanisms that allow them to resolve some of the coordination and bargaining issues
we discussed. But entrepreneurs are not necessarily known to each other. Indeed,
many would-be entrepreneurs in a reformed economy are not engaged in business
in the pre-reform steady state (because taxes and bribes are too high, or because
their abilities are less suited to a bureaucratic environment). Furthermore, unlike the
bureaucrats, entrepreneurs probably do not have access to good communications and
are almost certainly less able to keep unruly members in line.
The ainalyses of this section and the previous one, therefore, lead us to conclude
that reform is more likely where powerful, centralized groups - for example high-level
bureaucrats and strong unions or industry trade associations - can bargain with one
another. These large groups are more likely to internalize the externalities present in
bribery and reform.
D. Reform and the Big Push
In this section we turn our attention to the production and marketing aspects
of the model. So far we have assumed that the level of profit from a single project
depends only on reform in the local bureaucracy, but does not depend on the overall
level of reform in the country. In other words, we have ignored the interactions among
investment projects. In reality, these interactions are probably important. We make
this point in a simple extension of our main model.
Suppose we extend the model to have a continuum of industries, indexed by i.
Profits in industry i are given by
9 = r(k 3, R) (4.1)
where R is the fraction of industries that have reformed. We assume i.1 > 0, r2 >
0, lri < 0, 7r < 0, and, crucially, x12 > 0. A number of realistic features can
lead to a situation where profits depend on the extent of reform. Since production
in a modern economy often relies on specialized inputs of intermediate goods and
services of skilled workers, production in a reformed industry may be more difficult
unless there is also reform in upstream input-producing industries and in the national
labor market. Unless there is widespread reform, a single reformed industry might
have difficulty in selling its goods to other sectors or exporting them abroad, since
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these trades will still require permission and licenses. Another source of the positive
externality is learning to adapt to the new market environment. More reform means
more examples to follow, saving learning costs. Most simply, given that reform raises
the overall level of investment, income, and aggregate demand, there are likely to be
pecuniary externalities that lead to higher profits from a higher volume of sales in a
reformed economy.
Our analysis of reform concluded that the extra payoff to the old bureaucrats and
the increased income of the entrepreneur depend positively on the profit 7r. Thus,
if profits depend on the overall level of reform as in equation (4.1) and there are
"strategic complementarities" in reform (since 7r12 > 0), there is clearly an issue
of coordination between industries. There is an incentive on the bureaucrat and
entrepreneur in each industry to wait for other industries to reform. In the extreme
case we might have multiple equilibria, where each industry will bribe in order to
be reformed only if enough other industries do so as well.'
0 
But even when the
coordination problem is not so severe, the size of the bribe that each industry is
willing to pay will depend positively on whether the rest of the country is being
reformed. Thus, the likelihood of reform (which depends on each industry being able
and willing to outbid the anti-reform interests), may depend crucially on whether
industrialists can solve the coordination problem as well as the free-rider problem.
E. Decentralization Redux
In this section we return to the issue of decentralization, and argue there are types
of decentralization that can help reform.
Decentralization Across Space
China and the former Soviet Union are the two regions of the world whose reform is
being followed with the keenest interest. But although both were socialist economies,
"'For analysis of games with strategic complementarities, see Cooper and John, 1988. Our analysis
is similar to Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
they differed significantly in their organization of production. Central planning in
the former Soviet Union was much more complete than in China (Sachs and Woo,
1994.). At the same time, China was much more decentralized economically. Qian
and Xu (1993) argue that, due to Mao, Chinese provincial economies became self-
sufficient and self-contained sub-economies. On the other hand, the Soviet Union
tried to exploit economies of scale and, for ideological reasons, scattered production
around the republics. Therefore, in China, a relatively small group of bureaucrats
and entrepreneurs can coordinate on a local reform and reap many of the benefits,
whether or not there is economy-wide reform. On the other hand, in the former Soviet
Union, reform has to take place in coordinated fashion across many regions, and in
some cases republics, for reform to be successful. Therefore there is a larger problem
of coordination in the former Soviet Union, the more centralized state. In this sense,
decentralization benefits reform.
Decentralization Over Time
So far we have investigated the issue of decentralization at a point in time, and
asked whether decentralization helps reform. But we can also think of centralization
as referring to the coordination of decisions over time. Suppose we define a centralized
bureaucracy, in this sense, as one where bureaucrats can bind their successors, i.e.
put into place policies that last longer than their tenure in office. In our model,
this implies that bureaucrats can, to some extent, commit their offices to "tax" (levy
bribes) only on second-period profits rather than on second-period income. So the
second-period bribe becomes:
W2=aGr(k) - 1 2k) 0 < < 1 (4.2)
where # is a measure of the degree of centralization. Notice that the investment k is
for two periods and jk is the prorated cost of the investment. When Q3= 1, the second
period bribe is like a profit tax, which is not distortionary. A Q closer to 1 means that
bureaucrats can control their successors, leading to both higher investment and higher
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bribes in the bureaucratic steady state. Our model of the steady state thus confirms
Shleifer Vishny (1993) intuition, for the situation where the failure of coordination
takes place over time: decentralized corruption reduces income and welfare for all.
However, this interpretation of decentralization also demonstrates our basic point:
institutional features that are harmful in the steady state may aid reform. In this
case, note that the most decentralized economies (the ones with lowest Q's) have
the most to gain from reform. But it is precisely in these economies that reform
is easiest, for three reasons. First, the fact that there are large income gains from
reform mean that there is more pressure for reform from the private sector (in terms
of our model, entrepreneurs can afford to pay larger bribes). Second, the fact that
the existing situation is grossly inefficient implies that it has less support, even within
the bureaucracy (in terms of our model, the young bureaucrats are unwilling to pay
large bribes to block reform). Third, the fact that there is less connection across
generations of bureaucrats probably means that bureaucrats now in power have less
vested in their office, and thus less of an interest in blocking reform. Thus they
probably need less persuasion (smaller bribes) to close their offices and let reform
take its course.
We do not mean to suggest that efficient bureaucracy is a substitute for reform,
although this is true in our model in the limit as 0 tends to 1. Shleifer (1994)
notes a number of reasons why bureaucracies, especially ones where corruption is
rampant, are likely to be highly inefficient. Nevertheless, we do believe that there
is something to the idea that there is broader support for reform in countries where
the pre-reform situation is intolerable. For example, compare the pre- and post-
reform experiences of Poland and Hungary. Hungary started the reform process with
a number of advantages that many expected would make it the leader in successful
reform in Eastern Europe. But reform and economic success in Hungary have trailed
what Poland has achieved, despite the fact that Poland started with fewer capitalist
economic institutions. (For a detailed exposition, see Kornai, 1994) Arguably, the
situation in Poland was sufficiently bad that the government felt it had the political
backing to engage in more thorough-going reform than was the case in Hungary,
leading Poland to leapfrog its more "advanced" neighbor.
We have argued that there are different forms of decentralization, some of which
are helpful to reform and others of which are inimical. If these different kinds of
decentralization are found together, it is not possible to say a priori whether decen-
tralization favors or hinders reform.
5. Conclusion
We analyze corruption in the context of institutional changes such as the post-
socialist reform. Our conclusion is generally the opposite of the widely received
view on corruption. We argue that a one-time surge in the level of corruption is
needed to induce the incumbent bureaucrats to give up their control rights. Our
analyses can explain a set of observations of transitional economies that have puzzled
many commentators, in particular, how rampant corruption can co-exist with rapid
economic growth.
Our conclusion stems from our new approach to corruption. First, we treat corrup-
tion as a by-product of the bureaucratic institutions; so changes in such institutions
have consequences for corruption. Second, we regard the bureaucratic institution
as a succession of generations of bureaucrats. Thus, bureaucrats are not a uniform
class. Our analysis emphasizes that reform does not affect different generations of
bureaucrats in the same way.
The implication of our conclusion should be treated with care. Although cor-
ruption during reform is unavoidable and necessary, it is not harmless and therefore
should not be left unbridled. Excessive corruption in overt forms can be politically
dangerous and should be controlled. But, within limits, corruption can be the friend
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of a well-designed program of reform.
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